Artificial Intelligence and Human Error Prevention: A Computer Aided Decision Making Approach: Quarterly Progress Report No. 2 by Chien, R.T.
REPORT T-59 ______ _______  MAY, 1978
s ,  2 COORDINATED SCIENCE LABORATORY
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND HUMAN ERROR PREVENTION: 
A COMPUTER AIDED 
DECISION MAKING APPROACH
QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NO. 2
R. T. CHIEN
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
THIS WORK TS SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION UNDER CONTRACT DOT-OS-80020
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS -  URBANA, ILLINOIS
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN ERROR PREVENTION 
A COMPUTER AIDED DECISION MAKING APPROACH
Quarterly Progress Report Number 2 
Covering the Period February 3, 1978 
to May 3, 1978
Principal Investigator: R. T. Chien
Contributors: L. Hollaar 
L. Peterson
C. Ross 
W. Brew
D. Chen
R. Morishige 
Y. Pan
This work is sponsored by the United 
States Department of Transportation 
under Contract D0T-0S-80Q20
May 26, 1978
11. INTRODUCTION
Research continued this quarter on the conceptual design of an onboard 
computer software system for enhancing the safety of commercial airline 
flights. Because this system provides Safety Enhancement by Computer 
REasoning it has been named the SECURE system and will be referred to as 
such throughout this report.
Work was performed in four areas. The first area was that of crew 
member interviews. A third interview was held with a group of United Air­
lines pilots to set their views on the usefulness of an intelligent computer 
on board commercial aircraft. They generally felt that such a system would 
be useful and offered many suggestions as to what tasks it might perform.
This interview is discussed in Section 2 and a separate technical report on 
the interviewing conducted to date with the airline crew members is in 
preparation.
The second area was the design and implementation of the Instrument 
Verification System. A five-level approach was established for determining 
the consistency of an output of an instrument with respect to the outputs 
from other instruments. Algorithms which provide values for a given flight 
parameter have been implemented. This allows, for instance, estimations of 
altitude based on more than one instrument. The first level, which is the 
comparison of these estimations, has been completed. The result of this work 
is described in Section 3.
The third area was the design and implementation of the Script Based 
Monitor System. The notation for a script has been formalized. Three levels 
of scripts have been implemented to describe a flight operation from preflight
to postflight. These scripts provide the context in which instrument 
readings can be interpreted and system failures diagnosed. The result 
of this work is described in Section 4.
The final area of work is the implementation of an aircraft simulator.
A program was written to control the flight dynamics of a hypothetical, 
simplified, three-engine jet liner. The outputs of the simulator correspond 
to the outputs of flight instruments and can be altered to simulate failures 
or out-of-calibration conditions. This work is described in Section 5.
Section 6 describes the work expected to be performed during the
third quarter.
32. PILOT INTERVIEWS
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To assist in the study and design of the SECURE system, a t-kird intor- 
ylpw session was conducted on February 17, 1978 with a group of United 
Airlines pilots. This interview contributed very greatly to our overall 
knowledge and understanding of flight operations, flight crew functions, 
and the air transport business. The session took place in the Flight 
Operations Center of United Airlines at O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, 
Illinois. Seven hours were spent in talking with six senior pilots, in 
touring the dispatch area, and in viewing the cockpit of a DC-10.
Coordinating the visit of the group and making himself available for the 
entire seven hours was Captain R. L. Stimely, a United Airlines Flight Manager. 
Included in this group of senior Captains flying out of O'Hare, were:
James Rosater, J. D. Tuitt, J. 0. Martin, James Lacey, and James Dees.
After being presented with a very brief introduction to the system, some 
of the pilots stated that as they had flown safely for many years without the 
system, they saw no need for it at this time. In fact, they feared that if 
excessive use were made of such a computer system, a pilot-weakening 
dependence might develop. However when asked if there were any specific ways 
in which they thought it could help, there was no lack of suggestions.
Every pilot wanted to have assistance in making holding pattern and 
alternate landing calculations. They all would also like to have accurate, 
updated weather information available on board. They recommended that the 
airborne computer be made part of a data link with ground based systems to 
provide more and better communications in general and continual updating of 
aerial navigation and weather information in particular.
4Captain Stimely expressed a fear that without a means to transfer data 
into the airborne system, its usefulness would be greatly limited. Unless 
he and other pilots are convinced that the data used by the system are
trustworthy, they will reject its conclusions in no uncertain terms. In
---
discussing present automated warning systems, he felt that there were too
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many horns and buzzers already without adding more. But jae further stated 
that certain basic and accustomed warnings, such as those for engine fire 
and overspeed, should be retained in their present form. He was concerned 
about what would happen in an electrical power failure. He also cautioned 
that the proposed computer system ought not to depend for its operation on 
other more expensive subsystems like the Inertial Navigation System. He 
said that this system is rarely used by United Airlines because it is too 
expensive to purchase and operate. The airline has a few systems available 
on a plug-in basis for all its aircraft, but they are not standard equipment. 
Even its ability to calculate winds aloft, which can then be used to determine 
accuracy of weather forecasts, cannot justify its cost.
His discussion of fuel management was another example of cost-consciousness 
on the part of the airline. Flight plans are drawn up with an initial fuel 
weight based on precise estimates of expected burn-out with a 45-minute 
reserve and about a 5-minute contingency supply added. Carrying extra fuel 
would add weight and entail unnecessary expense. The pilot, after inspecting 
the computer generated flight plan, still has the option of requesting more 
fuel than it calls for, but such action was not presented in a favorable 
light. Records are kept of the fuel usage of both individual planes and 
pilots.
5The procedure for generating flight plans with a computer was care­
fully explained and an actual example of the process was demonstrated.
The inputs to the computer are the source and destination of the flight, 
the projected weight of the aircraft and its contents, and the weather 
conditions throughout all regions of interest. The weight has a variable 
component, the amount of fuel to be carried, which is determined as part 
of the flight plan. Weather information is continually updated, and 
primarily consists of hazardous weather conditions and wind velocities and 
directions as functions of altitude and ground coordinates. Two principles 
guide the flight plan generator: Avoid regions of severe and dangerous
weather, and minimize the weight of fuel to be carried. Fuel usage is 
decreased by flying at higher altitude and by lessening adverse wind 
velocity. Roughly, an increase of 1000 feet in altitude is equivalent to a 
reduction in wind velocity by 9 knots. The output contains instructions to 
the pilot about the route, speed, and altitude he is to maintain to minimize 
fuel consumption. These plans have proven to be very accurate and reliable, 
and they are now accepted by most pilots without question.
Captain Stimely felt that it would be useful for the computer to record 
a complete history of the operation of all engine, electrical, and hydraulic 
parameters of the aircraft during a flight. If a value then occurred outside 
its normal range for an extended period of time, these records would indicate 
the need for adjustment or repair. Noting such malfunctions is now the 
responsibility of the crew, but they are not able to continually monitor all 
the aircraft parameters. He noted that computer monitoring would be valuable 
during the flight also, and could be used to alert the crew to possible 
trouble. He liked an automatic tie-in system in which the light turned on as 
a warning was also the button to push for recovery.
6The pilots stated that they are very busy from the start of a flight 
until the plane reaches 5000 feet, and again at landing. However, they had 
no specific suggestions as to how a computer system could relieve their 
workload at these times. (The captains are performing high-level tasks at 
these times, and the computer system may not be able to directly assist 
them as much as it can aid the flight engineer.) Many were eager to have 
the computer system store large amounts of various kinds of information on 
board the aircraft. They especially would like it to contain a library of 
emergency procedures which could be quickly referenced when needed. These 
procedures, they said, should give priority to those items requiring 
immediate action while reserving others, such as recovery checklists, for 
later. They should closely resemble those available in existing manuals, 
but would be more readily accessible.
Much more complete aircraft and flight information than it is now 
possible to carry could also be stored in the computer. As not all aircraft 
are alike, not even similar models from the same manufacturer, the data 
needed would have to be particularized for each individual plane. The sector 
frequencies that are in use for radio communications could also be stored.
But to determine which ones are needed and when, the computer system needs to 
know the flight plan as well as the present location of the aircraft. This 
information should be available via the data link and from onboard calculation.
Captain Stimely stated that under certain conditions, aircraft are per­
mitted to fly with some equipment inoperative. Before take-off, the crew 
is notified about any deficiencies by means of two lists, the M i n imum  
Equipment List (MEL) and the Configuration Deviation List (CDL). The MEL 
specifies any disabled interior equipment on a given aircraft and the
7conditions which must be met in order for it to be allowed to fly. There 
are also special procedures needed in these circumstances. For example, 
an inoperative fuel quantity gauge is allowed provided that the fuel flow­
meter is functional. The CDL is like the MEL, but is concerned with equip­
ment missing or damaged on the exterior of the aircraft. In both cases, there 
is usually a weight or speed penalty, or both, imposed on the aircraft.
By examining actual emergency situations in detail, especially ones that 
resulted in accidents, it is possible to determine more specifically how an 
airborne computer system can be used to promote aircraft safety. During this 
conference at O'Hare, only one instance of this kind was discussed, but it 
was an instructive case. It concerned a crash of a DC-8 cargo plane in Utah, 
in which the pilot was killed. The following description is conjectural as 
the NSTB has not issued an official report on this incident.
It appears that an electrical bus had failed and this fact was known to
- ----- --- - -- - ---- -— - ------------------------ - --------------- - -- ----------
the pilot. When he attempted to lower the landing gear prior to landing, the
light signalling its deployment and locking did not come on. As the pilot was
unable to see the gear himself, he was in doubt as to whether the gear had
failed or the light was inoperative because of the faulty bus. He wished to
obtain information about the circuitry by radioing the United Airlines
Maintenance Operations Center in San Francisco. To have time for this
communication and a subsequent check-out, he requested instructions for
entering a holding pattern from the local Air Control. For some unknown
reason, he set himself on a heading which led to his crashing into a mountain.
The local radar was not able to monitor his course with sufficient speed to
warn him in time to avert the disaster.
8In addition to the suggestions and recommendations of the captains with 
regard to the usefulness of an airborne computer system, a very large amount
of detailed information about aircraft and flying was obtained from them ,
indirectly. Some examples are listed here.
1. The United Airlines policy on VI is simple: Abort if VI is not
reached; otherwise press on. Captain Stimely stated that most 
pilots would resolve borderline cases in favor of taking off.
2. There are no airfields in use by United Airlines such that an 
engine failure at VI would cause trouble. The airlines do not 
operate with that small a margin of safety.
3. Since most runways in use are long, the rotate velocity is 
usually less than VI. Hence, rotation occurs at VI.
4. Vl must be recalculated unless the manifest weight is close to 
the projected weight. How close depends on the plane, as in the 
following examples:
747: -3700 to +3180 lbs.
737: -1000 to +675 lbs.
5. Delco Corporation is designing an energy-management system which 
will shortly be undergoing testing. John Kaufmann and Rudy 
Polklar of Delco in Milwaukee are persons to contact for further 
information
6. The radio altimeter is very accurate from the ground up to 2500 
feet. The pressure altimeter, which is coupled to the central 
air data computer, is useful in the range -700 to 45,000 feet.
On the DC-10, it and all other instruments are electrically 
operated.
7. Once a climb rate of 1000 feet/minute is achieved, the DC-10 can 
maintain this rate to an altitude of 24000 feet on cruise power 
alone.
During this interview, and the two preceding ones, many of the routine
tasks performed by the flight crew in every phase of a normal flight were 
identified. It is felt that many non-critical functions can be performed more 
quickly, accurately, efficiently, and conveniently with the help of an 
airborne computer system. These tasks include: continous instrument
monitoring and record keeping; automatic checklisting for takeoff, climb,
9descent, and landing; calculation of weather, fue1-management, and 
navigational data; and the storage and retrieval on demand of special an 
emergency procedures and information. These functions alone will require 
a large, flexible knowledge base, the contents of which will need to be 
updated frequently, possibly via a data link.
Further information needs to be gathered on the precise use and useful­
ness in actual practice of various instruments, such as the radio altimeter, 
and on the procedures actually used to verify their readings. Also, a 
more explicit characterization of exceptional flight crew tasks, which 
require the postponement or halting of routine tasks, needs to be obtained. 
In critical situations, it is imperative to determine the precise actions 
actually performed and required in order to help reduce the workload of the 
crew and enable them to stay ahead of the aircraft. The observation of 
actual flight simulator sessions would be an excellent means for procuring 
knowledge of this kind.
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3. THE INTELLIGENT VERIFICATION OF FLIGHT INSTRUMENT OUTPUTS
The design of the instrument verifier reflects the following con­
siderations. First, whenever inconsistent results occur due to instrument 
failures, it would be more helpful to the pilot to point out possible 
trouble sources than to merely give him a general warning. Second, although 
an immediate response from the verifier is always desired, delays in the 
response occur due to slow changes in the state of a failing system. A 
delayed observation can collect data variations over a period of time, and 
thus provide second order information to help the decision-making during the 
instrument verification process. Finally, it is most important that the 
computer help the pilot by reducing his workload, rather than burdening him 
with heavy man-machine communication. Since requesting comments or actions 
from the crew will certainly increase their workload and detract their 
attention from regular flight control, a troubleshooting strategy that 
requires pilot cooperation should not be applied unless all other strategies 
fail.
Based on these considerations, a five-level approach is propooed. The
7
overall relationship 
sistencies are
the five strategies is shown in^Figure 1. Incon-
ameter
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3.1 The Detection of Inconsistencies from Multiple Instrument Outputs
Parameters indicating aircraft status (altitude, location, etc.) can 
either be read directly from instruments or they can be computed from 
instrument outputs. Advanced aircraft are usually equipped with redundant 
instrumentation, so that one instrument can be checked against the others. 
Thus, a particular parameter may be computed in several different ways, each 
based on one set of instrument outputs. This suggests a straightforward 
strategy to verify instrument outputs. First evaluate each formula, for the 
target parameter and compare the results. If all of these results agree 
(within a certain tolerance) with each other, it may be assumed that all 
related instruments are functioning properly and the result is acceptable.
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On the other hand, if the computed results are not in agreement, there must 
be at least one malfunction among the related instruments. In this case, 
the pilot should be informed of the inconsistency.
Inertial VOR 1 VOR 2 VOR 1 DM E1 VOR 2 DME 2 ADF 1 ADF 2
Navigation
System
(INS)
---- ►»
©  ©  ©  ...
Data Propagation
Alternative
Results
Figure 2. The detection of inconsistencies using different sources.
The example of Figure 2 illustrates the strategy of verifying the 
instruments of the aircraft navigation system by computing the aircraft 
location from each set of instruments and comparing these results. If all 
the results agree with each other, the conclusion is that the navigation 
systems are functioning properly.
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3.2 The Isolation of Faulty Instruments by Reasoning
When an inconsistency is detected in the verification process, the 
system can help the pilot not only by informing him of the abnormal 
situation, but also by pointing out possible faulty instruments. One way of 
indicating the faulty instrument is to analyze those source instruments which 
contribute to the inconsistent results and to issue a candidate list of 
possibly faulty instruments, ordered by their relative chance of occurrence.
Whenever the system is requested to verify an instrument, it should give 
a real-time response if possible. Therefore, any computation and check-up 
that can be done without further observation should be performed first. If 
this fails to give a confident answer (or fails to locate the faulty 
instrument during diagnosis), further information may still be obtained 
through delayed observation. The computer directed diagnosis which relies on 
delayed observations of certain parameters, or on pilot controlled experiments 
on the aircraft control, may preclude an immediate report to the pilot about 
the faulty instrument. The design of the Instrument Verification System 
should be structured so as to reduce this time delay in order to still be 
useable by the pilot.
Figure 3 illustrates this process for an aircraft with the following 
navigation instruments: INS, VORl, V0R2 and DME1. If the location reading
from INS is consistent with the location computed from VORl and V0R2, while 
the computed result from VORl and DME1 is not consistent with the other two, 
the verifier will conclude that DME1 is probably faulty.
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Figure 3. Fault isolation by source data analysis.
3.3 Confirmation by Related Instruments
Some instrument outputs may not contribute directly to the computation 
of a parametric value, but can still provide evidence to support or reject 
the values which have been computed from other instrument outputs. While 
consistent confirmation from the supporting evidence increases our confidence 
about the result, an inconsistent report is also useful because it can help 
the troubleshooter in isolating instrument faults.
15
Figure 4. Using ADF to confirm a location computed from VOR's.
The example illustrated by Figure 4 shows an aircraft with two VOR's 
and one ADF. Although a single ADF reading cannot lead to an independent 
estimation of location for comparing with the result computed from two VOR's, 
the Verifier can use the ADF reading to confirm the result from the VOR's.
3.4 The Collection of Time Related Information through Delayed Observation
The verification of parameters based on a snapshot of the system status 
is not always possible, because their relations may be dominated by 
differential equations. To verify such parameters, the system must have the 
ability to delay its current process for a certain period of time and to 
return for a later observation.
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Needed to 
Observe 
N2 Drop
Figure 5. A delayed observation of N2 to confirm an engine failure.
Figure 5 illustrates the condition when the EGT indication is not 
consistent with that of the EPR. This situation may be caused by engine 
flame-out (EGT low) while the EPR-reading fails to reflect the situation. 
Or the situation may be caused by a defective EGT sensor that triggered 
the flame-out report. One possible way out of this difficulty is to make 
a delayed observation on N2's rpm reading since N2 will change slowly 
because of the rotation momentum of the engine turbine. In this example, 
N2 drops after a time delay, finally confirming the flame-out situation 
and consequently reporting the EPR failure.
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3•5 Diagnosis by Experimentation
After the system has done everything it can to verify the instrument 
outputs without modifying the aircraft status and is still uncertain about 
the result, there is one more step it can try. It can initiate an experiment 
on the aircraft control and watch for its response. To avoid confusing the 
pilot, such an experiment should be sanctioned by the pilot, or should be 
performed with the cooperation of the pilot. This approach has been arranged 
as a final backup step because the pilot*s attention must be diverted, which 
can add to his workload.
Figure 6 illustrates how the Verifier asks the pilot to increase the 
throttle to check the Fuel Flow (FF) indicator.
3.6 The Implementation of the Instrument Verification System
During this quarter, work was started on the coding of the Instrument 
Verification System. This work focussed on the implementation of the section 
which detects inconsistencies in the estimated parameter values. The ability 
to perform this function depends on knowledge of the aircraft, its systems 
and its instruments. The determination of consistency depends on the ability 
to propagate tolerance ranges through a computation. The parts of the 
knowledge base which have been implemented are discussed in the following.
3.6.1 Knowledge about Flight Parameters
This is the general knowledge about flight-control parameters that 
one may learn from flight textbooks. For example, to find the aircraft 
location, the following strategies, which are found in the DC-10 manuals, 
may be applied [2,3]:
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Figure 6. Instrument verification by experimentation.
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1. Read LATITUDE and LONGITUDE from the Inertial Navigation System
2. Compute location from 2 VOR-readings.
3. Compute location from VOR- and DME-readings.
4. Compute location from 2 ADF-readings.
5. Estimate by "Dead-reckoning".
Such knowledge can be organized in a LISP property-list under the
name "LOCATION" and the property "TO-FIND":
(’LOCATION ((READ-INSTRUMENT INS/LOC)
(LOC-FROM-V0R1+V0R2)
(LOC-FROM-VORl+DME1)
(LOC-FROM-ADF1+ADF2)
(LOC-FROM-DEAD-RE CKONING)
)
’TO-FIND)
In general, knowledge that relates each flight parameter to a unique set of 
instruments can be modularly stored into the knowledge base.
3.6.2 Knowledge about Flight Instruments
This is the kind of knowledge the one can find from a flight 
instrument manual:
VOR
READING-RANGE : 0 - 360 degrees
ACCURACY: + 1 degree
TO-OPERATE: power-on RMI
power-on VOR-RECEIVER 
function-select/RMI VOR 
free-select/VOR-RECEIVER
(dialed frequency on VOR-receiver)
Again, this knowledge can be stored into the knowledge base in the form of 
a LISP property-list:
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('VOR (0 : 360 degrees) 'READING-RANGE) 
('VOR (+ I degree) 'ACCURACY)
('VOR (AND (POWER EMI ON)
3.6.3 Knowledge about Ground Navigation Stations
This is the kind of information that may be found in the Aerodrome 
facility directory. Such knowledge can be represented in LISP as a list 
of N-tuples:
((NAME . CMI)
(LOCATION . ((N 40 02 04) (W 88 16 34))) 
(FREQUENCY . 110.0)
(CHANNEL . 37)
)
( . . .
(POWER VOR-RECEIVER ON) 
(FUNCTION-SELECT RMI VOR) 
(FREQUENCY-SELECT VOR-RECEIVER
? STAT ION ■-FRE QUENCY )
TO-OPERATE)
VOR-STATIONS
RESULT [ TOLERANCE ]
DATA SOURCE
[LOWER-BOUND^ UPPER-BOUND^ [L0WER-B0UND2 U?PER-BOUND2]
Figure 7. Propagation of tolerance ranges.
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3.6.4 Tolerance Propagation
In the real-world, it is difficult to determine, based on single-value 
results, whether two estimations of a parameter are consistent with each 
other. Instruments and sensors are subject to built-in errors. Such errors 
should be accounted for during computation by propagating them toward the 
final results. Figure 7 illustrates how to format a data representation which 
specifies its normal value within a certain tolerance range. A set of 
tolerance propagating operators, called the TP-operators, which combine and 
propagate data with its tolerance attachment, were implemented.
The LISP forms to represent values with tolerance attachements are as 
follows:
LISP-form meaning
(X (XL XU)) X with lower-limit XL and 
upper-limit XU
(X (7. P)) = (X (X-X*P% X+X*P%))
(X (+ DX)) =(X (X-DX X+DX))
X (X (X X)) or (X (7, 0))
(x a  xu)> X with unknown lower-limit
(X (XL ?)) X with unknown upper-limit
(X (? ?)) X with unknown upper and lower limits
(x a  ?)) =(x a  ?))
? =(? (? ?)) indefinite data
The above forms are designed to provide a convenient user interface.
The TP-operators should be able to logically propagate the indefinite "?".
The result of evaluating each formula for a given parameter is a set of values 
with their respective tolerances. The next step is to decide whether these
22
results are consistent with each other: Two results are said to be con­
sistent if there is a common value in the tolerance ranges of both results.
The following example illustrates how to find the aircraft location 
from different instrument systems. The navigation systems available in 
this aircraft are assumed to be V0R1, V0R2, DME1, ADFl, ADF2. Each type of 
instrument is associated with their built-in tolerance: VOR-readings are
within 1 degree of accuracy, ADF-readings 3 degrees, and DME is approximately 
1% of the total indicated distance. At least three estimations of current 
location can be computed from these instrument readings and their corre­
sponding tolerances as can be seen in Figures 8-11. The consistency of these 
navigation instruments are decided from the tolerance-ranges of such results.
A.
VO
©
/ \  '
Ri DMEl AD‘
"\
\
(FI A#2
Figure 8. Three schemes for determining aircraft location.
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Result:
Tolerance Radius 2.6 N.M.
EON ~ (N 41 16 10)
(W 87 47 28)
(N 40 02 04) 
(W 88 16 34)
Figure 9. Aircraft location computed from VORI and V0R2.
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( N 40 29) 
(W 88 56)
N Result:
Figure 10. Aircraft location computed from ADF1 and ADF2.
Result:
1 x 1.5 N.M. SQ
( W 88 16 36)
Figure 11. Aircraft location computed from VORI and DME1.
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4. THE SCRÎPT BASED MONITOR
The function of the computer monitor is to continuously observe the 
flight environment and evaluate the situation for possible errors that would 
threaten the safety of the flight. The use of a computer monitor can signifi­
cantly reduce the pilot workload by relieving the pilot of the tedious task 
of monitoring numerous instrument readings and mentally integrating the raw 
data to determine the overall system performance. The computer monitor 
would be especially useful during periods of high workload when the pilot's 
attention is at a premium. Another advantage of the computer monitor is that 
the monitor would not be affected by typical human failings such as boredom, 
fatigue, or fixation.
We have completed a study of the desired attributes of a computer 
monitor [1], and have determined them to be the following:
1. Verification of instrument readings.
2. Detection of instrument reading deviations.
3. Diagnoisis of a common cause for related deviations.
4. Report of appropriate deviations and/or diagnosis to the pilot.
5. Automatic checklist presentation.
6. Generation of a history of deviations and significant events 
for later analysis.
The monitor's awareness of the flight environment requires the measurement of 
all significant aircraft parameters via sensors. The instrument readings are 
verified for logical consistency. The verified instrument readings are 
compared against a context sensitive model for agreement. A diagnosis is made 
based upon the deviations to determine if there is a probable common cause.
Figure 12. A three level profile of a flight.
Ni
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Any diagnosis and its supporting evidence are reported to the pilot when 
appropriate and are recorded for later analysis.
The crux of the detection of deviations lies in the determination of 
the normal state of the aircraft, which requires an awareness of the flight 
context. There seem to be two types of context in the flight domain. One 
type of context is a phase-based context which is of a temporal nature. The 
phase-based context reflects the highly regular characteristics of the flight 
as can be seen in Figure 12. For example, it can be expected that the takeoff 
roll phase follows the taxiing phase and precedes the climb phase. The 
phase-based context is reflected in the crew checklist where different modes 
are specified for different phases of flight. The other type of context is a 
condition-based context. Often the normal state of the aircraft or the normal 
procedure for the flight will change with the occurrence of an event that may 
be either internal or external to the airplane. For example, if there has 
been a generator malfunction, then the normal state of the bus-tie relay 
should be open. Also when flying under gusty wind conditions, it is normal to 
increase the airspeed when maneuvering close to the ground.
It is important for the monitor to be aware of the phase-based context 
since this context defines a normal flight. We have designed a data structure 
called "script11 to hold the information that describes the various phases of 
a flight [4]. A script is defined below:
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<script>::= ( <name>
<entry condition>
<next scripts>
<normal states>
<ranked concems>
<checklist>
<procedure-scripts> )
<name>::= the script name.
<entry condition^-::= key system parameters that signal this context.
<next scripts>: := possible next contexts.
Cnormal states>: := the normal state of the aircraft. This is the
context sensitive model.
<ranked concems>::= ordered system parameters used for conflict 
and priority resolution.
<checklist>::= explicit checklist if available.
<procedure-scripts>::=<scripts>*, also the sequence of contexts
that make up this script. The <script>* 
also decomposes into actions.
The script is a tree structure. At the top, the context description 
is vague. The context description becomes more precise as we progress down 
the tree. The script is also a recursive data structure. The <procedure- 
scripts> nonterminal of a given script may be composed of a sequence of scripts, 
which make up a more precise description of the present script. Thus, each 
context, represented by a script structure, may be decomposed into a sequence 
of more finely detailed contexts also represented by scripts. The top level 
script is shown in Figure 13 and contains only the pointers to its three 
descendant scripts. One of its descendants, the takeoff phase, looks like 
Figure 14. The TAKEOFF-S script is necessarily vague since the takeoff phase 
covers a multitude of contexts.
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(FLIGHT-S NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL
(TAKEOFF-S GRUISE-S LANDING-S))
Figure 13. The Top Level Script
(TAKEOFF-S (FUEL = MAX
ALT = 0 -> LOW)
(CRUISE-S)
(FUEL = MAX 
THRUST = 0 -> MAX 
ALT = 0 -> LOW 
GEAR = DOWN)
NIL
NIL
(START-ENGINE-S TAXIING-S 
TAKEOFF-ROLL-S CLIMB-1-S 
CLIMB-2-S))
Figure 14. A Second Level Script
The twelve third level scripts shown in Figure 12 have been implemented. 
Oily the <entry condition>, <next scripts> and <normal state> fields of these 
scripts have been implemented in detail. The <checklist> and Cranked concerns> 
fields have been implemented for some of the scripts. The preliminary monitor 
tracks the context transitions and the script transitions, and detects errors 
in a context sensitive fashion [5,6,7].
The condition-based context is to be implemented through event-action 
rules. These rules will implement the irregular, though frequently occurring, 
events that either alter the normal state of the aircraft or the normal 
procedure for the flight. Examples of such rules are the following.
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1. generator malfunction -> bus tie relay open.
2. gusty wind condition -> increased airspeed when maneuvering 
close to the ground.
The emergency procedures for the aircraft can be implemented through these 
event-action rules. A data base of the emergency procedures and other flight 
knowledge should prove to be very useful.
The preliminary monitor system consists of the modules shown in Figure 
15. The system presently consists of four programs running concurrently under 
time-sharing. The system environment is described by a state vector that 
describes the aircraft's internal systems and its trajectory in 3-D space.
The state vector manager updates the vector and sends out the state vector to 
the monitor and the display program. The display program outputs the 
pertinent state vector entires on a terminal screen so that the human observer 
can determine the present flight environment. The monitor periodically scans 
the state vector and checks for context transitions and system errors as 
defined by the scripts in the script data base. The fault insertion program 
causes faults in the system by altering the state vector. Presently, the 
flight environment is updated by the fault insertion program. An aircraft 
simulator has been completed, but it is not linked to the system yet. All 
communications to the state vector manager are routed through the IPCF 
facility in the TOPS-10 operating system for the CSL PDP-10 computer.
In the next quarter, we plan to implement the event-action rules for the 
condition-based contexts. The sufficiency of the script structure will be 
investigated. The cause-effect structures necessary for a more general computer 
monitor will also be investigated.
-------- > CONTROL PATH
----------»DATA PATH
AIRCRAF
SIMULATOR
Figure 15. Block diagram of the run time system.
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5. THE AIRCRAFT SIMULATOR
In order to evaluate the verification and monitoring strategies being 
developed for the SECURE system, it is necessary to have a test bed in which 
to try these ideas. The aircraft simulator fulfills this function. The 
simulator was designed to allow for the following:
1. It must simulate relevant aircraft systems but avoid excessive 
detail.
2. It must be easy to implement.
3. It must be easy to modify.
4. It must be modularized.
5. It must allow faults to be introduced into the aircraft.
Since the simulator is intended to act as a test bed for the SECURE 
system, it should be capable of simulating all the aircraft systems with which 
the SECURE system will have to interact, but at the same time it should avoid 
superfluous detail. Thus a simple aerodynamic model is appropriate but a 
simulation of a galley electrical system is not. As the SECURE system evolves, 
its test bed will have to evolve also. Thus ease of modification and 
modularity are important. Since the main purpose of the SECURE system is to 
aid the pilot when the aircraft is not functioning properly, the simulaor 
should be able to simulate faults in the aircraft systems.
Figure 16 shows the basic structure of the simulator. The pilot inputs 
to the simulator via the standard controls, elevator, aileron etc. The state 
variables reflect the simulator's view of the current state of the aircraft, 
that is, its position, speed, fuel quantity, etc. The Dynamics procedures are 
used to update the state variables. Sensors provide a mechanism for SECURE
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Fault
Pilot Knowledge
Base
Figure 16. Diagram of the aircraft simulator.
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and the pilot to view the state of the aircraft. It should be noted that the 
sensors and the state variables may disagree if a sensor fault has been 
introduced into the simulator. The experimenter has two inputs to the 
simulator. He may cause any aircraft system to appear to have failed. He 
may also modify any variable in the simulator.
The simulator is roughly that of a three engine commercial jet. The 
major activities of the simulator thus far center around maintaining the 
aircraft's position, speed and attitude via a simple aerodynamic model. The 
aircraft systems which are currently being simulated are summarized below:
1. Flight system
controls - aileron, elevator, flaps, speed brake
attitude - pitch, bank
speed - air speed, rate of climb
altitude - radio altimeter, barometric altimeter
2. Navigation system
inertial nav. - latitude, longitude, heading 
radio nav. - VOR, DME
3. Engine system
thrust
fuel - fuel flow, fuel quantity
4. Miscellaneous
landing gear 
time
Faults are introduced into the simulator by breaking the update path to 
certain variables in the simulator. These variables will remain at their 
current value unless changed by the action of the experimenter. For example, 
a flameout of the number one engine is introduced by failing the variable 
VTHRUST1 and then setting VTHRUST1 to zero. Similarly, the failure of the 
barometric altimeter is accomplished by failing the sensor variable SBARALT 
and then setting SBARALT to an erroneous value.
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During the next quarter, we plan to link the simulator to the other 
programs in the intelligent monitoring system. In addition, the simulator 
will be expanded to include a more detailed simulation of some of the 
internal systems of the aircraft.
37
6. FUTURE PLANS
In continuing the interviews with flight crews, we will attempt to 
interview a group of young pilots with engineering backgrounds. We are 
particularly interested in learning their attitudes toward an intelligent 
onboard computer and in learning their opinions of how they can benefit from 
such a computer. In addition, we shall attempt to arrange a visit to the 
United Airlines simulation facility in Denver to observe the types of 
situations which develop during a flight and to observe how the pilot copes 
with those situations.
Coding will continue on the SECURE system. It is expected that the 
system will be nearly completed by the beginning of the fourth quarter. The 
Instrument Verification System will be nearly complete with all levels 
implemented except for the experimentation level which will be delayed until 
a later time. Several aircraft system knowledge structures will be added to 
the knowledge base. In addition the Script Based Monitor will be near completion. 
Routines will be added to determine flight context from the flight parameters 
and from knowledge of where the plane should be in the flight script. The 
requirements and general design of the planning system will be done. In 
addition, a priority resolution system will be implemented to notify the pilot 
of failures.
Finally the aircraft simulator will be interfaced to the SECURE system. 
Routines will also be added to allow the specifying and the effecting of time 
delayed sequences of changes in the flight parameters. This will allow the 
specification of flight scenarios and fault insertions.
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QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE
The total expenditude during the period February 3, 1978 to 
May 3, 1978 was $20,193.
The estimated expenditure for the third quarter is $30,173. 
figure will reflect travel expenses and increased computer usage.
This
